Of all the aspects of interwar Europe we have covered thus far, the one I have found to be the most interesting is the creation and rise of fascism - specifically, how it came to be successful in the nations of Italy and Germany but not in other places, such as France and Britain. We went over the list of things "necessary" to have a successful fascist state and other things that weren't quite necessary but that definitely helped to contribute. Some of these things were more obvious than others, like the necessity of a national crisis (such as the Great Depression), or the incapacity of the established national government to deal with said crisis. However, the thing that I found most fascinating - and what I really didn't know, due to the "typical" images that are given of Mussolini and Hitler - was the amount of blame that can be put on the conservatives in Germany and Italy. Typically, we see thousands of people marching and saluting as these dictators give high-intensity speeches (and we imagine them to be spitting out anti-Semetic slurs as they are). This is the way we imagine them coming to power, and not much is done to combat this belief.
However, reading about the slow, scheming ways that these men came to power shed light onto a subject I thought I knew more about than I really did. Both Hitler and Mussolini vowed early in their careers to NOT use violence - for example, after Hitler tried to take Munich over in 1923. They were very aware of the fact that they were going to have to make calculated moves to exploit the government already in power and that the only way to really get control was to establish a majority. The fragmented political parties of Italy and Germany made it easier to gain this majority, but it does not detract from the inability of the conservatives to acknowledge the dangers lying within these power-crazed men. The lack of a real definition of "fascism" - even when attempted by Mussolini (he really gives more of a list of what it is not then what it is) - shows how desperate the people of these countries really were. It took a very bad situation for fascism to find a foothold, but it took more than this to really take power. For fascism to come to power in both countries, the traditional conservatives (who had come to view power as a given and not as a right ) had to truly fail to take control of their countries and adapt to the times at hand. Mussolini and Hitler did not simply seize power; it was handed over to them slowly.
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A fantastic blog. I like, and agree, with the way you identified the seemingly contradictory and malleable ways that leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini rose to power. You mentioned Hitler's failed attempt in 1923 which landed him in jail. I've only read a little about this event, but some authors have argued that Hitler, secretly, didn't want that attempted overthrow to go as far as it did because he knew it would fail. Instead, he was somewhat swept along by the fervor of his followers/group and, instead of trying to stop it and potentially jeopardize his rising status, went along with the attempted overthrow. Though I've read this, I'm unsure if it's widely accepted.
ReplyDeleteWhat I liked most is how you identify and place blame on the conservatives, especially in Germany. We discussed how the center quickly began to dissolve in Germany during this time and this is what is most interesting to me. In most democracies, even quasi-democracies, the middle or the moderate is often where the power lies, it is where parties try to skew towards. I think we can see that in Britain, France and the United States during this time. But in Germany, Italy and Russia, that was not the case. And I think that is in where, to some part, lies the explanation for the 30-year period of unthinkable war and destruction.
A great blog that really reflects on the crux of Paxton's argument. I think it is almost more frightening to think that Hitler and Mussolini came to power by invitation and not really so much through force. They rose more from the failure of those in power to offer a viable alternative than through the compelling power of their popularity or ideas.
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